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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
tion clearly against public policy but not violating a criminal statute, could
occur. Such discrimination would be against public policy but not unlawful.
It was reasoned that if discretion were allowed in such cases, there could be
little objection.
The majority opinion, however, limits the courts to considerations of
lawfulness only in deciding whether to approve charter applications under Sec-
tion 10 of the Membership Corporations Law. This limitation will prohibit the
use of personal standards and lead to consistency, a reform 'long overdue.
P. D.C.
"CONTINUING WRONG" THEORY ADOPTED IN ACTION FOR INADEQUATE FREIGHT
RATES
In Ripley v. International Railways of Central America, the minority stock-
holders of International Railways (hereafter referred to as Irca) brought suit
on behalf of the corporation against the United Fruit Company (hereafter de-
scribed as United).17 United was in practical control of Irca by virtue of a
voting trust created in 1928;18 consequently it (United) was in a fiduciary
relationship to the minority stockholders of Irca. Damages are based on alleg-
edly inadequate freight rates for hauling United's bananas from the interior of
Guatemala to the coast.
In 1936, Irca, United and Compania Agricola de Guatemala (hereafter de-
scribed as Agricola), a subsidiary of United, entered into business arrangements
which were controlled by ten contracts each relating to different aspects of the
parties' business dealings. One of these contracts, entitled "Main Agreement,"
was approved by the stockholders of Irca. This agreement contained terms by
which Agricola helped Irca finance new equipment and obtain certain other
operating benefits. Agricola received notes and Irca stock in exchange. Agricola
also agreed to use the main lines of Irca to transport its bananas and supplies,
"under such arrangements as the parties hereto may agree upon from time
to time."
The "Trackage" and "Operation of Trains" agreements were executed at
the same time, but they were not submitted to the stockholders of Irca. These
agreements "fixed" the total cost to Agricola for shipping a carload of bananas
at $60.00; whereas, a similar haul would cost an independent producer $130.00
after 1939.
The referee awarded damages to the plaintiffs for the difference between
the rates paid and the fair and reasonable value of the transportation. Recov-
ery was limited to the six year period preceding the commencement of the
action. 9 The referee's determinations were affirmed by the Appellate Division. 0
The Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed the judgment.
17. 8 N.Y.2d 430, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960).
18. Ripley v. International Railways of Central America, 276 App. Div. 1006, 95
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1st Dep't 1950).
19. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48.
20. 8 A.D.2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1959).
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The primary contention of the defendant United was that the ten agree-
ments were really one integrated contract,21 and that in order for Irca to repu-
diate the rate agreement it must restore to the defendant all benefits received
under the other agreements. 22 United also maintained that Irca could not
attack the contract(s) because the cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations.23 United further claimed that the shareholders had ratified
the freight rates, and finally that the plaintiffs had no standing24 to bring the
action because they were not stockholders of record at the time the contracts
were executed.2 5
The Court rejected the contention that the rates had been ratified by the
shareholders on the ground that the rate agreements had never been submitted
to a stockholders' meeting for approval. The Court considered the fact that the
plaintiffs were not shareholders in 1936 unimportant because it viewed the
wrong as a continuing one. This apparently establishes a new cause of action
with every shipment under the inadequate rate schedule.
The adoption of the continuing wrong theory effectively eliminates the bar
of the statute of limitations, at least as to the six years immediately preceding
the action, because it implies that the cause of action arose not when the
injurious contract was executed, but every time the defendant took advantage
of its terms. In addition, the majority opinion states that the rate contract is
severable from the other 1936 agreements because in 1933 the same rates had
been set by contract for a 25 year period, so that a reaffirmance by Irca of
the 1933 agreement could not possibly have been a consideration advanced by
Irca for the benefits it received under the other 1936 contracts. 20
It appears, as pointed out by Judge Dye in his dissenting opinion, that
the majority in adopting the theory of continuing wrong have partially nullified
the protection afforded by the statute of limitations against litigations of old
claims. This same theory restores to subsequent purchasers of stock the right
to bring suit on a cause of action that arose previous to their ownership, as
long as the harmful effect is continuing. This result appears to be contrary to
21. Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E.2d 551 (1953).
Holding that separate memorandums may be pieced together if they all relate to the same
transaction in order to satisfy requirement of the Statute of Frauds that the party to be
charged must have subscribed to a written memorandum. This case stands for the propo-
sition that the existence of a signed contract can be established rather than separate contracts
each of which can be construed as one integrated contract.
22. Barr v. New York, L.E. & W.R. Co., 125 N.Y. 263, 26 N.E. 145 (1891).
23. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48.
24. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61.
25. Cf. Henis v. Compania Agricola de Guatemala, 116 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1953).
I decide the present cause of action for the recovery of damages and other equitable
relief has long been barred by the applicable Delaware statute of limitations.
The case was affirmed on the basis of Rule 23(B), Fed. R. Civ. P., 210 F.2d 950 (2d
Cir. 1954).
26. A promise by one party to do that which he is already under a legal obliga-
tion to perform is insufficient as a consideration to support a contract.
Carpenter v. Taylor, 164 N.Y. 171, 58 N.E. 53 (1900).
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the express provisions of Section 61 of the General Corporation Law,27 which
was enacted to prevent the practice of buying into a corporation to commence
suit on a pre-existing cause of action. 28
D.G.M.
CORPORATION BOUND BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT OF ITS PREDE-
CESSOR PARTNERSHIP
The case of Reif v. Williams Sportswear, Inc.2 9 raised the issue of whether
a corporation, in spite of the fiction of its separate legal existence, is bound by
a collective bargaining agreement made by its predecessor (partnership) in the
same business, when there has been no change in the persons controlling and
owning the two businesses. The respondent corporation moved for a stay of
the arbitration proceedings on the ground that its separate corporate existence
insulated it from its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement under which
the arbitration proceedings were being sought by the petitioner union. The
motion was heard on the affidavits of both litigants.
The common law rule regarding a corporation's liability for a contract
of its promoters is that the corporation cannot be bound by such a contract,
since at the time the contract was entered into, the corporation was legally
nonexistent and, therefore, could not be made a party to the contract by its
promoters. Exceptions to this rule have been grounded upon several theories,
including: ratification, adoption, estoppel and novation. Perhaps the most prev-
alent theory in New York State is that of implied adoption, which requires that
the corporation, with knowledge of the contract, receive some benefit under it,
and that the party rendering that benefit do so without knowledge of the new
corporate identity acquired by the business.30 Other jurisdictions have invoked
the so-called "alter ego" doctrine 3' to find corporate liability in the special
situation where a corporation and its predecessor have been controlled and
owned by the same persons. 32
In the present case the Court of Appeals did not decide the question of
whether the respondent corporation had, by taking the benefit of union labor
while knowing of the collective bargaining agreement, implicitly adopted the
agreement. Part of the difficulty precluding the Court's consideration of this
question was the insufficiency of the affidavits as to a finding concerning the
27. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61:
In any action brought by a shareholder in the right of a foreign or domestic cor-
poration it must be made to appear that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the time
of the transaction of which he complains or that his stock thereafter devolved
him by operation of law.
28. Northridge Cooperative Section No. 1 v. 32nd Avenue Construction Corp., 2 N.Y.2d.
514, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957).
29. 9 N.Y.2d 387, 214 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1961).
30. Morgan v. Bon Bon Co., 222 N.Y. 22, 118 N.E. 205 (1917). For a review of
earlier cases see 1 White, New York Corporations 22 (12th ed. 1947).
31. For a thorough discussion of the "alter ego" doctrine, see. Schifferman, "Alter
Ego," 32 Calif. S.B.J. 143 (1957).
32. See e.g., Zander v. Larsen, 41 Wash.2d 503, 250 P.2d 531 (1952); Fena v. Peppers
Fruit Co., 185 Minn. 137, 239 N.W. 898 (1931).
